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Abstract. This analysis shows how Japanese legations, first established in Europe during the 
1870s, were not just symbolic gestures but played a key role in the Meiji government’s quest 
for international recognition. The concept of resident ambassador was unfamiliar beyond the 
European world, so the transition from sending visiting envoys to establishing permanent 
missions was a pivotal stage. Here a comparative framework gauges the importance of 
Japan’s new strategy within the context of similar experiments by states such as the Ottoman 
Empire, Persia, and subsequently China and Siam. The case of Sameshima Naonobu, Japan’s 
first resident minister in Europe, highlights the cultural barriers the Japanese faced. Assisted 
by Frederick Marshall, an Englishman at the Japanese Legation in Paris, Sameshima’s 
research on the mysteries encoded in this particular social universe offers some insight on the 




During the 1870s, the most striking addition to the diplomatic corps in Europe was the arrival 
of the Japanese resident minister. At the start of the decade there was no such post, but soon 
permanent missions had opened in several capitals, all housing accredited diplomats from 
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Tokyo. It was a remarkable change for an Empire that had resisted engaging with European 
states for hundreds of years. Commercial treaties had only been signed in the 1850s, and even 
then with reluctance. Western diplomats were promptly sent off to staff legations and 
consulates in Japan’s new treaty ports, but there seemed no immediate prospect of Japan 
establishing such bases in the West. Then, suddenly in 1871, Japanese diplomats appeared in 
London, Paris, and Washington, presented their credentials, and moved in.   
Some non-European states had already set up offices in Britain and on the continent: 
Ottoman embassies first opened in the 1790s and on a sounder footing in the 1830s; Persian 
legations had also appeared recently in Paris and London. Shortly after resident ministers arrived 
from Japan, moreover, others would follow from China and Siam. Yet although the resident 
ambassador had been a regular feature of diplomacy in Europe since the Renaissance, the idea 
was culturally unfamiliar elsewhere. So what impelled these states to take this quantum leap 
from sending visiting envoys to opening permanent missions? The dynamics of this transition 
have only been charted in general terms, so here a comparative framework places Japan’s new 
strategy in context by first exploring some of the key features and logistical hurdles involved.1   
Opening legations was one step, gaining recognition another. Besides the formalities of 
protocol, invisible rules raised cultural barriers for any aspiring non-European diplomat, 
especially one from a non-Christian state. When Sameshima Naonobu was appointed Meiji 
Japan’s first chargé d’affaires in Europe, his immediate challenge was to win the acceptance of 
the diplomatic corps. In his struggle to understand the idiosyncrasies of this select club, he turned 
for support to Frederick Marshall, an Englishman hired at the Japanese Legation in Paris, to help 
him navigate the challenges of life in his new post. The result was a collaborative project to 
articulate some of the mysteries encoded in this particular social universe. As this analysis 
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highlights, it could also shed light on a subtle dialogue between different cultural worlds, 
offering insight on the nature of the diplomatic corps itself. 
Diplomats on parade would become an increasingly familiar sight by the nineteenth 
century, but it was still a major undertaking to send an embassy to the far-off courts of Europe. 
Motives usually included some combination of trade and war, often seeking allies in a regional 
conflict. Ottoman envoys had begun making this journey early in the sixteenth century, first to 
Paris and then London, and soon they were followed by ambassadors from Morocco and Persia.2 
In the seventeenth century, embassies came from Siam, first to The Hague and later to Versailles, 
although diplomatic relations with Europe then lapsed until the mid-nineteenth century.3 Political 
tensions over corsair attacks also brought North African envoys to Britain and France from as far 
as Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.4    
Growing commercial networks in the Mediterranean prompted early attempts to set up 
consulates in Europe. In 1715, an Armenian merchant became the Persian consul in Marseilles, 
although this outpost closed down on his death in 1726 and would not reopen until 1894. In the 
meantime, Moroccan consulates appeared at Gibraltar in 1796 and Marseilles by the mid-
nineteenth century.5 
If sending visiting envoys was expensive, only pressing security concerns could justify 
the cost of opening permanent missions. It was a step often preceded by an incubation period of 
exploration in search of models for internal reform. The most elaborate attempt yet had been the 
Grand Embassy of Peter the Great in 1697-1698, as Russia, in James Der Derian’s phrase, 
“countered its estrangement from Western Europe” by selectively assimilating its technology, 
culture and also diplomacy.6 It was no coincidence when legations opened over the following 
decade. Starved of financial support, however, this first generation of Russian ambassadors 
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struggled to gather intelligence. They also met with a cool reception in the courts of Europe, 
where their “treatment ranged from indifference to ridicule and contempt”.7   
Similarly, the appearance of Ottoman embassies reflected growing security concerns after 
new treaties with the Austrian Empire and Russia. A key motive was to gather intelligence, 
building on the work of “ambassadors” who for several decades already had been adding 
inspection tours to their itineraries when visiting European capitals.8 The first such missions 
opened in London in 1793, and four years later in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin.9 Whilst they coped 
with ceremonial duties, however, the new ambassadors were unversed in diplomatic practice and 
failed to command respect. Dependent on Greek “dragoman” interpreters, they also relied on the 
diplomatic bags of other states as they had no courier system of their own, and with no Ottoman 
foreign ministry to supervise, poor archiving led to confusion.10 This landmark venture was “a 
false start”, and these missions closed down altogether by 1821.11 
The Ottoman embassies that began reopening from 1835, however, were better organised, 
and this time staffed by professional diplomats. The language training they received from the 
recently formed “Translation Chamber” enabled them to study European models in more detail, 
often with a focus on legal reform. A foreign ministry was also created in 1836, though it would 
not boast its own archive until after the Crimean War.12 
Envoys from Indian states had also been appearing since the late eighteenth century, 
usually travelling to London, although Versailles welcomed three ambassadors from Mysore in 
1788.13 They were often undermined by their ambivalent status, however, as the lands they 
represented were fast becoming client states of the East India Company. Costly enterprises, 
moreover, the longest stayed in Britain for 15 years, but they never led to permanent missions.14 
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Whilst new treaties and security issues soon prompted a fresh wave of resident diplomats 
from the East, this was rarely an immediate response. A British Legation opened in Tehran in 
1809, but it was not until the end of the Anglo-Persian War in 1857 that Persian legations 
appeared, first in Paris and then in London. Amongst the duties of the first resident minister in 
France was to supervise more than 40 Persian students who had arrived there already from the 
recently-founded Dâr al-Fonun school of modern sciences in Tehran.15  
Britain’s treaties with China (1842), Siam (1855), and Japan (1858) also took some time 
to translate into permanent diplomatic missions. Visiting envoys from Siam reached Britain in 
1857 and France in 1861. The Japanese appetite for travel became apparent as large retinues, 
reminiscent of daimyō processions in their ostentatious scale, reached Washington in 1860 and 
toured across Europe in 1862.16 They were also Japan’s first overseas envoys since two missions 
reached Rome in 1585 and 1615, sent there by daimyō lords who had converted to Christianity 
during the sengoku era of “warring states”.17 Further delegations were despatched abroad by the 
now ailing Tokugawa regime, besides groups of students to the Netherlands, Britain, and Russia. 
Some domains even broke the official ban on unauthorised travel and sent student groups of their 
own.18 
China, on the other hand, was only induced to send diplomatic missions to Europe by 
“the prodding of helpful foreigners”.19 The single precedent had been in 1733, when envoys 
visiting the neighbouring Kalmyk Khanate were redirected to St. Petersburg on learning that 
their hosts had become vassals of Russia.20 It was not until 1866, however, that Robert Hart, in 
his post as Inspector General of China’s Maritime Customs Service, persuaded his employers to 
let him take a low-ranking Mandarin official and some students on an inspection tour of Europe. 
Two years later, he also helped plan a diplomatic mission to America and Europe led by Anson 
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Burlingame, the recently retired American minister to China.21 Missions of apology followed in 
the wake of attacks on French and British diplomats: to Paris after the Tianjin Massacre in 1870; 
and London after the murder of Augustus Margary in Yunnan Province in 1874. 
The new Meiji state responded faster and was now already sending its first resident 
ministers to Europe. Japanese legations opened in Paris in 1871, London, Vienna, and Berlin in 
1873, and Rome and St. Petersburg in 1874.22 Consulates were also established at The Hague in 
1873, briefly in Milan, then in Marseilles in 1874, and London in 1876. China’s first legation in 
London did not open until 1877, again with Hart involved, and over the next two years others 
appeared in Paris, Berlin, and Madrid.23 Next was the turn of Siam, as legations opened in 
London in 1882 and Paris two years later.24 Varying levels of cultural adaptation were on show 
amongst these latest members of the diplomatic corps. Tokugawa envoys had travelled in 
samurai dress, but Meiji diplomats were accustomed to wearing European clothes. Educated in 
Singapore and at King’s College London, Siam’s first resident minister, Prince Prisdang 
Chumsai, was also familiar with English life. By contrast, the staff at the Chinese Legation clung 
to their native attire, attracting the notice of curious onlookers on their walks around London.25  
Established in 1869, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the Gaimushō – set out to 
establish permanent missions from the start. To some extent this reflected the new Meiji 
regime’s declared intention of seeking knowledge throughout the world, announced in the 
Charter Oath the previous year.26 It also complemented the leaders’ desire to change Western 
perceptions of Japan. Together with the high-profile Iwakura Embassy that toured the world in 
the early 1870s, the opening of legations symbolised a progressive new order, in contrast to the 
isolationist policies of the old Tokugawa state.27  
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Early in 1870, the Gaimushō submitted a proposal to send resident ministers to Europe, 
and a few months later this was approved.28 Diplomats were needed abroad, it pointed out, to 
counteract the high-handed treatment that Meiji officials felt they received from foreign 
representatives in Japan. In this respect, an appearance of parity under international law 
“promised a measure at least of empowerment to those who conformed to its practice”.29 In 
sentiment it was not dissimilar to the Indian envoys, who appealed to a higher authority in 
London against the perceived injustices inflicted by “the Resident”, the quasi-diplomatic East 
India Company official posted to each main Indian court.30 In Japan as well, there was a thin line 
between constructive help and interference. Townsend Harris, the first American resident 
minister, had often coached his Tokugawa counterparts on the rudiments of international law. 
Now the mantle of informal tutor had passed to the British minister, Sir Harry Parkes, who, as 
something of an oracle to statesmen like Iwakura Tomomi, never hesitated to proffer advice. At 
an imperial audience on 15 April 1869, he even gave the Emperor Meiji a dressing-down for not 
showing due respect when referring to Queen Victoria and then walked out.31       
It was thus imperative, the proposal stressed, that Japan should have a regular platform 
for gathering intelligence in the capitals of Europe. At this stage the Gaimushō faced a daunting 
task, however, for “the new Meiji leaders had no distinct diplomatic culture of their own.”32 
Nevertheless, it could draw on records compiled under the foreign ministry that had been formed 
by Tokugawa officials in 1858.33 The previous regime had also created a translation bureau in 
Edo, the “Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books” – Bansho Shirabesho – which 
trained many of the language experts who had served in recent missions to America and Europe. 
 An unusual feature in Japan’s case, moreover, was the emergence of a distinctive 
research culture on the alien world of Europe, long before opportunities to explore Europe itself. 
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As the only port open to Chinese and Dutch ships, Nagasaki had been a key source of 
intelligence on the outside world under Tokugawa rule.34 Subsequently it was also the focus of 
“Dutch Studies” – rangaku – as interest grew in European science, initially confined to medicine 
and astronomy, but in the last decades of the regime featuring military studies and navigation as 
well. Dutch was increasingly taught at domainal schools, and promising young specialists were 
sent away to centres of learning like Nagasaki and Osaka. After the new treaty ports opened in 
1859, their training within Japan soon shifted to study abroad.  
This embedded research culture partly explains the surge in numbers of Japanese students 
in Europe after the Tokugawa ban on overseas travel was finally lifted in 1866.35 It also led to a 
wave of publications following their return. Some were particularly useful to the Gaimushō, such 
as an 1868 treatise on international law, based on lecture notes taken by Nishi Amane in Leiden, 
and an 1869 Japanese version of Charles de Martens’ Guide Diplomatique, translated by Fukuchi 
Gen’ichirō, who had served as an interpreter on two Tokugawa overseas missions. Meiji Japan 
mastered international law far more rapidly than is commonly assumed.36 
Besides the diplomatic requirements in Tokyo, plans to open legations abroad were partly 
a response to this growing Japanese presence abroad. Like their Persian counterparts before 
them, the first resident diplomats had a duty of care for students already in Europe. In 1871, for 
example, there were 107 Japanese students recorded in Britain alone.37 The initiative would also 
build, in a more structured way, on the ad hoc appointment of foreign consuls and overseas 
commissioners that had been developing over the last decade. 
The treaties signed in 1858 had suggested reciprocity by providing that Japanese officials 
could be posted abroad, just like the Western representatives in Japan. If pressed on this point, 
however, the ambassadors on the first Tokugawa mission to the United States in 1860 were 
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instructed to explain that legations were not required, since there were no Japanese merchants 
and ships trading overseas.38 Nevertheless, they agreed to engage a San Francisco merchant, 
Charles Wolcott Brooks, as an unpaid commercial agent. Grateful for his assistance and then for 
finding some reputable mining engineers, the Tokugawa authorities recognised him in 1867 as 
their consul, just as the new trans-Pacific mail route promised a substantial increase in traffic. In 
1870 he was confirmed as honorary consul by the Meiji government when a Japanese Consulate 
opened at San Francisco and, before retiring, he joined the Iwakura Embassy on its travels 
around the world.39  
Brooks was one of the trading consuls now so prevalent in the field of commerce, trusted 
merchants with some influence, but not necessarily from the country they served. In Paris, the 
preparations for the Tokugawa delegation to the 1867 Exposition Universelle led French officials 
to suggest a similar arrangement. In 1865, Baron Jules de Lesseps – the brother of Ferdinand of 
Suez Canal fame – was made Japan’s commissioner at the exhibition. A banker, Paul Fleury-
Hérard, was also enlisted as his advisor and later recognised as consul general. In 1864, 
meanwhile, a Tokugawa mission returning from France had recommended the creation of 
permanent diplomatic missions.40 Japanese resident ministers were even appointed in 1867, with 
instructions to set up legations in Paris and London, but the regime collapsed before these plans 
could materialise.41 Fleury-Hérard was now replaced by Count Charles de Montblanc, a Belgian 
noble who had represented the Satsuma delegation at the recent exhibition. For a few months in 
1870, Montblanc even ran a consulate in Paris near the Gare Saint-Lazare, although a scheme to 
promote him to the rank of chargé d’affaires foundered when Maxime Outrey, the French 
resident minister in Japan, insisted that it was against international law for a Frenchman to serve 
as the diplomatic representative of a foreign government in Paris.42    
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Initially, the new Gaimushō’s operations in Europe were thus largely confined to sending 
special missions. As Japanese students in Britain still had no consular representation, a 
commissioner was sent in 1870 to supervise. The appointment fell to Alexander von Siebold, a 
German noble with ten years’ experience in Japan who had accompanied the Tokugawa 
delegation to the Paris Exposition; however, he stayed only briefly before moving on to 
Frankfurt.43 Similarly, Ueno Kagenori was despatched to London later that year on a commission 
to settle the repayment of a loan raised by a British entrepreneur, the extravagantly named 
Horatio Nelson Lay, for the construction of the Yokohama-Tokyo Railway. 
Whilst plans to send resident diplomats were now in train, a glaring problem for the 
Gaimushō as a start-up organisation was the shortage of trained personnel to staff its legations.44 
The new vice-minister, Terashima Munenori, was a veteran of the Satsuma party that had 
travelled covertly to Britain in 1865 and so recruited heavily from the young compatriots who 
had accompanied him. One of these, Sameshima Naonobu, was appointed Japan’s first 
diplomatic agent in Europe. Reflecting the need to utilise the previous regime’s expertise, he was 
joined in a supporting role by Shioda Saburō, who had served as a Tokugawa interpreter during 
the Paris Exposition. Sameshima’s credentials covered three countries: Britain, France, and 
North Germany. It was an ambitious portfolio, although not an isolated case. In 1882, the 
resident minister of Siam was appointed to no less than 12 countries when the first legation 
opened in London. 
 The son of a doctor, Sameshima was still only 25 and, like many early Meiji diplomats, 
very young for such a senior post abroad. Nevertheless, he had shown some aptitude for 
language as the only member of the Satsuma group to specialise in literature rather than a 
technical field.45 In 1867, after two years in London at University College, he and five other 
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students had followed a former British diplomat and itinerant journalist, Laurence Oliphant, 
across the Atlantic to live in a Christian colony in New York State. He then returned to Japan 
after the fall of the Tokugawa regime, together with Mori Arinori, who at age 23 was appointed 
Japan’s first chargé d’affaires to the United States.46 
Mori was readily accepted when he reached Washington early in 1871, but Sameshima 
met with a cool reception from the British. Parkes objected to the way he had been appointed 
“without any reference to myself although this was the first diplomatic officer being sent by the 
mikado’s government to England”. Given Sameshima’s “inexperience in diplomatic business” 
and “the inferior rank he held in his own country”, Parkes was also sceptical of his ability to 
represent Japan’s interests “in no less than three countries at once”. The timing was unfortunate, 
moreover, as Parkes was away on business when Sameshima was “suddenly despatched” from 
Yokohama in November 1870. Above all, there was conflicting information over his status, for 
as Parkes observed, “they [the Gaimushō] scarcely knew their own minds as to the position he 
was to fill”.47 Initially described as benmushi, a title with no Western equivalent, this post was 
subsequently divided into three grades corresponding to the ranks of minister plenipotentiary, 
resident minister, and chargé d’affaires as designated at the 1815 Congress of Vienna.48 
Sameshima and Mori presented themselves in the lowest of these tiers, but the term benmushi, 
never widely accepted, was scrapped altogether in 1872. 
Meiji Japan’s first attempt to set up a legation in Europe thus ended in failure. 
Sameshima was told that he could not be recognised as chargé d’affaires when he presented his 
credentials to the foreign secretary, Lord Granville, in February 1871. Instead, the description of 
his duties “to look after the Japanese students in England, France and Prussia” suggested to 
Parkes that “the title of ‘Commissioner’ [without diplomatic rank] will probably be found to 
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serve all the purposes of his mission.”49 Clearly, the British saw him as a straight replacement for 
von Siebold and Ueno, the two commissioners who had been to London the previous year. Also 
from Satsuma, Ueno held the same rank in Japan. 
After languishing for several weeks in the Langham Hotel, Sameshima travelled to 
Berlin, capital of the newly unified German Empire, where his credentials were accepted by the 
chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. He then made his way to Paris, just as life there was settling 
down after the recent Commune, and announced his arrival in July from the Hotel Chatham, 
where Oliphant was also staying as a correspondent for The Times. Fortunately, Jules Favre, the 
French foreign minister, had already accepted his credentials at a previous meeting in January 
when, to avoid the Siege of Paris, Sameshima called on him in Bordeaux en route to London.50  
France usually followed Britain’s lead on Japanese matters, and Outrey, perhaps 
influenced by Parkes, had expressed reservations when he saw Sameshima in Yokohama two 
months before.51 Sameshima offered a semblance of continuity, however, presenting himself as a 
replacement for Montblanc, and Favre must also have been impressed by Bismarck’s subsequent 
approval. Japan’s first legation in Europe thus opened in Paris in August 1871; and on Oliphant’s 
recommendation, Sameshima hired Marshall, a long-term English resident, as Conseiller 
Européen. A man “of sound character and fluent in both English and French”, Marshall became 
his right-hand man.52 
Parkes now took a gentler stance, convincing Granville that “it would be well” to 
recognize Sameshima as chargé d’affaires in London after all, “as he appears to have been 
received in that capacity at Paris and at Berlin”.53 In the event, however, Terashima was 
appointed Japan’s first resident minister in London. Arriving with the Iwakura Embassy in 
August 1872, he presented his credentials to Queen Victoria in December, but stayed for just a 
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year before returning to take up the post of foreign minister in Tokyo. Terashima’s successor in 
London was Ueno, who served there until the arrival of Mori Arinori in 1880. Japan’s first four 
resident diplomats in Britain were thus all men from Satsuma. 
Sameshima, meanwhile, concentrated on redeeming his career in France. In 1872, he was 
promoted to the rank of resident minister, and the following year to extraordinary envoy and 
minister plenipotentiary. In 1874, he was awarded the Legion d’honneur, amongst other 
decorations. He then spent several years in Tokyo assisting Terashima as vice-minister, but 
returned to Paris in 1878, where he supervised the expansion of Japan’s diplomatic presence in 
Europe to include the Iberian Peninsula and Benelux countries. Often plagued by ill health, 
however, overwork took its toll, and he died in 1880 at the age of just 35. In an unusual break 
with convention, his funeral, held at Montparnasse Cemetery with Buddhist rites, was attended 
by the entire diplomatic corps.54    
Whilst the opening of Japanese legations may have looked quite methodical overall, 
Sameshima’s ordeal shows how haphazardly it all began. Nevertheless, there were soon 
encouraging signs. On one level, the experiment apparently complied with the counsel of foreign 
advisers like Parkes to follow Western modes of diplomatic practice.55 At the same time, Japan’s 
new resident diplomats provided a counterweight to the influence of ministers like Parkes in 
Japan. In 1876, for example, an article in the Japan Gazette, an English newspaper in 
Yokohama, pointed out a recent change in attitudes towards these foreign officials: 
The fact of there being Japanese Ministers Plenipotentiary, who are recognized as on 
an equality with those of other nations, the Government, and it may be added, the 
more educated people generally, have come to consider ministers much as other men, 
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and not as formerly in the light of ministering or destructive angels sustained by 
heaven-like power.56 
Gathering overseas intelligence was also instrumental in shaping perceptions in Japan. 
Public dissemination of such material helped, and between 1880 and 1889, for example, the 
Gaimushō Records Office issued a monthly magazine entitled Gaiji shisatsu zasshi 
[Observations on Foreign Affairs]. On sale for three sen per copy, it included numbered reports 
from Japan’s legations in Britain, France, the United States, and Russia.57 Henri de Blowitz, the 
celebrated Paris correspondent of The Times, captured an impression of this network in 1894:  
from all their numerous active and vigilant Legations has gone forth, and goes forth 
still, an incessant stream of monthly or bi-monthly reports, condensing in concise and 
vivid terms the events of the month or the two weeks that have passed, and drawing 
from the events described deductions which serve more and more to complete the 
education of the country.58 
The advent of the telegraph, moreover, was transforming diplomatic communications.59 
Cables with connexions to European capitals stretched as far east as Constantinople (1855), 
Tehran (1865), Singapore (1870), and Hong Kong, Shanghai and Nagasaki (1871).60 From a 
British perspective, Japan was so remote that correspondence had previously taken months to 
reach London from Tokyo. The submarine cable between Shanghai and Nagasaki was a start, but 
not until 1873, when a cable was completed – mostly – overland to Tokyo, could diplomats send 
telegrams direct from Europe.61 This new technology has been linked to the declining influence 
of Parkes, but it did not immediately curtail the independence of the “man on the spot”. Simply 
too expensive and bureaucratic at first, most correspondence was still handwritten and 
despatched by mail. Only later did reductions in cost have the impact on diplomacy that Lord 
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Salisbury, the British prime minister, proclaimed in 1889 when he told the Institution of 
Electrical Engineers, “we positively exist by virtue of the telegraph.” 62 
In the meantime, Japanese rather than Western use of the telegraph had a greater effect on 
the standing of foreign diplomats in Japan. As early as September 1874, telegrams written in 
English were exchanged between Enomoto Takeaki, the new resident minister in St. Petersburg, 
and Terashima, the foreign minister in Tokyo. 63 The effect was soon felt in the treaty ports, for 
as a report in the Japan Gazette noted in 1876, Japanese resident diplomats now “obtain the 
desired information from the fountainhead”. The article pointed out, “this being communicated 
by telegraph, the [Japanese] Government is frequently posted as to the views held by the heads 
of foreign states, before the ministers of those states resident in Japan, are aware of such 
themselves.”64 In May 1878, for example, Parkes informed the Foreign Office that he had just 
learned from Terashima about the postponement of a conference due to be held shortly in 
London. The theme of the conference was, ironically, on the telegraph.65 
From the outset, telegraphic communications ensured regular oversight of Japan’s 
legations by the Gaimushō. It also allowed them to take a more active diplomatic role than 
conveyed by the prevailing impression that, perhaps due to the high-profile conferences on treaty 
revision in the 1880s, key talks were conducted mainly in Tokyo.66 Already in 1876, Parkes had 
noticed how the Japanese were going over his head in an “attempt to gain their point directly 
through their ministers at the various foreign capitals”.67 In 1877, a fresh initiative sought to 
negotiate on treaty revision through Japan’s legations in Europe and America, rather than in 
Tokyo where the foreign representatives were seen as acting in concert.68 Subsequently, a multi-
lateral conference was even due to assemble in London, only to be switched to Tokyo after 
Terashima intervened, to the chagrin of his successor, Inoue Kaoru.69 The crucial negotiations 
16	  	  
that sealed the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in 1894, moreover, were held in London, 
leading to the end of extraterritoriality in the treaty ports in 1899. 
The new legations also created a suitable environment for the cultivation of a new, 
Japanese perspective on the diplomatic corps. “It was curious to see how completely, as far as we 
could judge, he adapted himself to his European surroundings, talking the jargon of the men of 
the world, and entirely at one with them in the interests of the diplomatic circle.” 70 This was how 
Nakano Takeaki, the Japanese chargé d’affaires, appeared in 1877 to Mary Blackwood, daughter 
of the publisher John Blackwood, when they met over dinner at the Marshalls' home in Paris. 
Previous incarnations of Japanese envoys had arrived in samurai dress, so perhaps she expected a 
more obvious cultural gap. Deputising for Sameshima who was away in Tokyo, Nakano already 
had some experience of overseas travel, but this was a very particular social universe. The 
diplomatic corps could easily expose a new arrival, even a European, to the discomfort of feeling 
like “a fish out of water”, and especially if they were from Japan.71 
To outward appearances this process of acculturation could appear almost seamless, a 
visible sign of the “emulative learning” that Shogo Suzuki describes as the highest stage of 
socialisation.72 In some respects there was a clear template to follow, everyday customs being so 
much part of diplomatic practice that they were enshrined in etiquette. In Paris, there was even 
an entire government department devoted to protocol. As de Blowitz described the Japanese 
Legation staff in 1894: 
They live an official life, keep to themselves, give receptions extremely well arranged, 
and correct dinners, where the guests are very well chosen; they never commit a 
blunder in etiquette; they are themselves scrupulously punctilious in their social 
duties, irreproachable in their dress and bearing at State functions; and they display as 
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much amiability towards the official set as courtesy towards the persons whose 
acquaintance they may have made in the world.73 
Observance of outward forms, however, was taken as read in the diplomatic corps. More 
daunting was the panoply of unwritten norms subconsciously embedded in this cultural world. 
François de Callières once broached this subject in 1716 when compiling the character traits of 
an ideal envoy in The Practice of Diplomacy. By operating at a pre-conscious level, Bourdieu's 
concept of “habitus” also helps to probe this field, identifying beneath the surface an ingrained, 
inculcated set of social differences and hierarchies that, although not innate, seem “inherent in 
the nature of things”, as if by “second nature”.74 Diplomatic manuals, for example, would still 
assume a degree of cultural familiarity beyond the experience of most new arrivals from Japan. 
Such were the hurdles that perplexed the Russian and Ottoman ambassadors of the 1790s and 
confronted Japanese resident ministers in the 1870s. 
On one level, their diplomatic rank commanded respect as the accredited representatives 
of sovereign states. On another, there were implicit rules, including a notional “standard of 
civilization”, even if this was simply rhetoric “to gate-keep membership of international society”, 
or just an illusion since “no stable standard emerged.”75 Yet although the concept has been 
exposed as Eurocentric and flawed by a narrow view of modernisation, this outlook certainly 
featured in the foreign ministries of Europe, and Meiji diplomats were confronted with the 
obstacles it implied.76 Such informal structures, called doxa by Bourdieu, were also elusive in 
that they consisted of “the silent experience of the world”.77 James Joll identified a similar 
pattern, or “what goes without saying”, in the unspoken assumptions “taken for granted” by 
European diplomats.78 For a Japanese resident minister, these obscure rules could be hard to pin 
down, let alone devise effective strategies to overcome the handicaps they imposed. 
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Following the untimely death of Sameshima in December 1880, Marshall was instructed 
by Suzuki Kan'ichi, first secretary at the Japanese Legation in Paris, to compile a report on the 
views of their former chief. In Marshall’s estimation, Sameshima believed “that not only [treaty] 
revision but the whole future of Japan's relations with Europe depended almost entirely upon the 
degree of confidence that Japan could inspire”.79 Similarly, de Callières had once identified the 
need for diplomatists to establish credit, a practice the British diplomat, Harold Nicolson, 
described as “akin to good banking”.80 In Bourdieu’s terms it meant enhancing prestige by 
accumulating the capital – social, cultural, and symbolic – that formed “the currency of power 
within a given field”.81   
One strategy the Japanese used was to emphasise a sense of shared values through the 
observance of diplomatic custom and ritual. Another was to cultivate social and professional 
networks. As de Blowitz pointed out in 1894, “everywhere as much as possible they have 
frequented diplomatic circles and developed their knowledge of international questions.”82 
Essential to this endeavour, although not cheap, was the physical space of the legation building, 
which set the stage for hosting social events. Situated close to the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, the 
hotel in the Avenue Marceau that Sameshima rented in 1873 proved conducive, and the Legation 
remained there for 33 years until its conversion to embassy status. In London, however, Ueno 
often complained to Terashima about the building chosen for the Legation in 1874. Located in 
Kensington Park Gardens, it seemed too remote from the other missions in town, notably the 
more impressive Chinese legation established in Portland Place in 1877.83 Subsequently, grander 
premises were found in Cavendish Square in 1880, at more than double the cost.84 
Highly paid foreign employees also played key roles as cultural brokers in fostering these 
networks. The personnel enlisted by Ottoman, Chinese, and Japanese missions suggest a range of 
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styles. For much of the Victorian period, the men appointed to London as Ottoman ambassadors 
were Greek and Italian Christians, culturally distinguishable from other Europeans only by the 
red fez they “always wore in common with all Turkish officials”.85 Another high-profile figure 
was Sir Halliday Macartney, for 30 years secretary to the Chinese Legation in London. Knighted 
for his services in promoting Anglo-Chinese relations, he could seem indispensable when 
serving ministers who had no command of English, a “not disagreeable” arrangement he found, 
as “he liked to hold the strings in his own hands”.86 
The appointment of Marshall as secretary to the Japanese Legation in Paris reflected his 
experience and contacts in France.87 When Sameshima arrived in 1871, Marshall had been 
serving on a charity committee, co-ordinating relief supplies after the Franco-Prussian War 
together with, amongst others, Baron Alphonse de Rothschild.88 de Blowitz, who also owed his 
post at The Times to an introduction from Marshall, described him as “an Englishman widely 
known in Paris and well acquainted with men and things”.89 When Mary Blackwood visited in 
1877, she observed that “his position . . . in the midst of the diplomatic circle made him 
thoroughly au courant with foreign politics and gossips of the different Embassies – a world of 
itself apart, and yet in touch at its different points with all the great centres of the world.”90 
Marshall played a central role as master of ceremonies until his retirement in 1888.91 A hint of 
this activity appears in the report on Sameshima’s funeral in The Times: “Many residents in the 
Faubourg St. Germain were also present, for the late Minister had repeatedly entertained on the 
neutral ground of the Legation the most aristocratic families in France, together with the official 
world, two classes meeting scarcely anywhere else.”92 
Another key development was the professionalisation of the Japanese diplomatic service. 
On Sameshima’s recommendation, apprentice secretaries were despatched abroad from 1876 
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onwards, recalling the British practice of sending student interpreters to Japan, amongst them a 
young Ernest Satow in 1862. 93 Sameshima also tried to demystify the field by articulating some 
of the unwritten rules of diplomacy. Working in collaboration with Marshall, he compiled a short 
manual for Gaimushō staff, the Diplomatic Guide, which Blackwood’s published in 1874. 
Drawing on selected quotes from prominent legalists, it spelt out “golden rules” for Japanese 
students to “understand the complex diplomatic customs of Europe, and teach them a basic 
knowledge of diplomatic practice”.94 Whilst this drew on de Martens’ Guide Diplomatique – first 
published in 1832 – in its coverage of even mundane clerical details, the Diplomatic Guide was 
possibly the first work of its kind in English, more than 40 years before Satow famously wrote 
his more extensive, standard work in the field.95  
In the course of formulating these ideas, Marshall’s own eyes were opened to a 
“mysterious” new Europe.96 This hidden world is described in “International Vanities”, a series 
of articles he wrote for Blackwood's Magazine in 1874 and 1875. These outlined taxonomies of 
ceremonial, titles, decorations, emblems, and other paraphernalia of diplomatic life. Assorted 
trinkets of symbolic capital were weighed in turn to measure their currency in the field. Titles 
found division into categories of possession, relationship, religion, and courtesy. Emblems 
ranged from flags and standards to coats of arms and badges, a group including liveries, 
uniforms, state seals, mottoes, and crowns.97 Decorations were also sorted into ribbons, stars, and 
crosses, as Marshall traced the evolution of orders from religious roots to aristocratic and modern 
forms. Notable examples included the Knights Hospitaller of St. John, the British Garter, and the 
French Legion d'honneur. In sum, he explained, “orders began with charity, piety, and battle; 
they terminate in a button-hole!”98 
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Drawing on Sameshima’s experience in the field, “International Vanities” became an 
ethnographical study of the European diplomat in his natural habitat. Marshall’s stated purpose 
sounds trivial enough, “to draw attention to some half-unperceived yet not unamusing forms of 
vanity”. Obliquely referring to his vantage point within the Japanese Legation, he explained, “if 
some strange necessity should forcibly direct attention to them, they shine out like a lantern in 
the fog.” Seen in this light, the hallowed practices of European diplomacy might not seem like 
second nature or inherent standards at all. Marshall compared them rather to ephemeral whims of 
fashion, observing that “ceremonial, forms, and titles are diminishing, but stars are multiplying; 
the shapes of vanity, like the shapes of bonnets, change as time goes by.” Lampooning iconic 
symbols was a device to expose the parochial nature of diplomatic culture in Europe. This more 
subversive agenda surfaced on occasion, as when Marshall described the “law of nations” as “an 
empty phrase” with no mechanism for enforcement. And so elastic were the criteria for awarding 
decorations, he noted, “there is no common rule to guide us – no standard to invoke.”99 
In September 1894, Japan’s standing in Europe rose overnight with news of its stunning 
military success against China. Reporting for The Times, de Blowitz commented, “incontestably 
during the last two days, since their startling victory, the Japanese have grown considerably in 
the opinion of the French public.” Several months had passed already, however, since the Aoki-
Kimberley Treaty was signed in London, making Japan the first eastern state to shake off the 
system of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Even now, the French seemed apprehensive over the 
prospect, but according to de Blowitz, “they forget that it was here in Paris that Japan made its 
first attempt to have the treaties altered.” This, he recalled, was the work of Marshall, operating 
“under the direction of his chief, M. Sameshima”.100 Whilst overstating the role of an old friend, 
it underlines the cumulative efforts made by the new legations over the past 20 years. 
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Conventionally, the end of the treaty ports in 1899 is seen as marking Japan’s “entry into 
international society” or “accession to the Comity of Nations”.101 Howland argues instead that 
since Japan was recognised as a sovereign state, this had been emerging for decades already, as 
shown by the activities of resident ministers in Europe. In 1874, for example, Ueno in London 
joined the International Law Association and, the following year, Aoki Shūzō in Berlin initiated 
negotiations for Japan’s entry into the Universal Postal Union.102 Less apparent from this 
critique, however, is the process of opening legations, the most visible symbol yet of Japan’s 
participation, and the essential platform for such activities. Neither does it feature in Auslin’s 
appraisal of the Iwakura Embassy “as a first step to remaking Japan’s place in the world”, even 
though, by this stage in 1871, Sameshima and Mori were already in situ in Paris and 
Washington103 To send one-half the government abroad on a global tour was a landmark event, 
but the new legations created a more durable structure for Japan’s engagement with the Western 
world.   
Like the Ottomans and Persians before them, security concerns framed the decision to 
establish permanent missions in Europe. A critical mass of overseas research also helped these 
legations to have an immediate, tangible impact on diplomacy in Japan. Not only did they 
contribute to key negotiations but, assisted by the telegraph, their intelligence networks helped 
provide a counterweight to the influence of Western ministers in Tokyo. At times the process of 
accumulating social and cultural capital seemed tortuously slow. Meiji dignitaries, for example, 
returned from visits to Europe “festooned with decorations”, but the Emperor Meiji did not 
receive the Order of the Garter until after Queen Victoria’s death.104 Nevertheless, there were 
encouraging signs, notably a newfound prestige in 1906 when Japan’s legations in London and 
Paris were upgraded to embassy status, just 13 years after the United States. Military victory in 
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the Russo-Japanese war helped, but Japan’s was one of only nine embassies in London on the 
outbreak of the First World War.105 
Japanese participation in this established club has been seen as helping to sustain the 
rules of an international society created in Europe long ago.106 It can also be viewed as 
contributing, if incrementally, to modifying existing norms and shaping a more global order that 
would follow.107 For early Meiji officials posted to Europe, the diplomatic corps presented a 
mysterious field that had previously defied attempts by other states to enhance their standing 
abroad. Barred from the Court of St. James in 1871, Sameshima, like others, initially struggled to 
win acceptance, but his experience exemplifies a rapid learning curve in deconstructing the 
world of the diplomatic corps.  By articulating some of its unwritten conventions, his 
collaboration with Marshall also subjected this field to new angles of enquiry, exposing hidden 
layers not fully realised by European diplomats themselves. 
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